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BAYESIAN DECISION MAKING IN GROUPS IS HARD
Jan Hązła, Ali Jadbabaie, Elchanan Mossel and M. Amin Rahimian
We address the computations that Bayesian agents in a network undertake
in an opinion exchange model, where they repeatedly act on private informa-
tion, taking myopic actions maximizing expected utility according to a fully
rational posterior. We show that such computations are NP-hard for two
natural utility functions, including the case where agents reveal their pos-
teriors. Our results are robust in the sense that they show NP-hardness of
distinguishing (and therefore also approximating) between posteriors that are
concentrated on two distinct states of the world. We also describe a natural
search algorithm that computes agents’ actions, which we call iterated elimi-
nation of infeasible signals (IEIS), and show that if the network is transitive,
the algorithm can be modified to run in polynomial time.
Keywords: Rational Choice Theory, Observational Learning, Bayesian
Decision Theory, Computational Complexity, Group Decision-Making, Com-
putational Social Choice, Inference over Graphs, JEL: D83, D85.
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Many decision-making problems involve group interactions among individuals with purely informa-
tional externalities. Such situations may arise in jury deliberations, expert committees, medical diagnoses,
etc. We consider a model with a network of rational, Bayesian agents, who receive private information
and act based on that information while also observing others’ actions. The process proceeds in discrete
rounds, with agents repeatedly broadcasting actions and updating beliefs. We focus on computational
resources required by the agents, showing both hardness and positive results.
In the past, researchers have offered interesting fundamental insights by restricting attention to groups
of size two. The seminal work of Aumann (1976) studies the interactions of two rational agents with
common prior beliefs and concludes that if their posterior beliefs are common knowledge, then they should
be the same: rational agents cannot agree to disagree. Later work of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis
(1982) demonstrates that to reach agreement in finite time for two such agents with common prior it
is enough to broadcast their posteriors back and forth. Following on, a large body of literature studies
similar questions, both in different models with Bayesian agents, as well as in settings where agents use
simpler, heuristic rules (Acemoglu et al. (2011); Bala and Goyal (1998); Banerjee (1992); Bikhchandani
et al. (1998); Mossel et al. (2014); Mueller-Frank (2013); Smith and Sørensen (2000)).
One reason for considering heuristics (so called “bounded rationality”) in place of full rationality is
seeming intractability of Bayesian calculations. When agents update their beliefs based on exchange
of information over a network structure, they have to consider complex redundancies and cyclical de-
pendencies. On the other hand, failure to account for them leads to mistakes and inefficiencies such as
redundancy neglect (neglecting the fact that several of the neighboring agents may have been influenced
by the same source of information, cf. Eyster and Rabin (2014)) and data incest (neglecting the fact that
neighboring actions may have been affected by the past actions of the agent herself, Krishnamurthy and
Hoiles (2014)). Even though hardness of Bayesian computations in social decision making models seems
to be widely believed, we are not aware of previous work making a rigorous argument for it.
In the model we study in this paper there is a random variable θ representing the unknown state of the
world, and a network of agents that receive private signals which are independent after conditioning on
θ. At every time step t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., each agent outputs an action that maximizes her utility according
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to her current posterior of θ. The action is chosen myopically, i.e., only utility at the current time is
considered, but the posterior is computed using Bayes rule. Agents learn actions of their neighbors on
the network and proceed to the next time step with updated posteriors. This model has been studied
in a series of works Gale and Kariv (2003); Harel et al. (2014); Kanoria and Tamuz (2013); Mossel
et al. (2016, 2014); Mossel and Tamuz (2010). Among other things, we know that the agents agree on a
common action in the limit, and that they learn the state θ if the network is sufficiently connected.
A natural instance of this model features utilities that induce agents to output their current posteriors,
or beliefs. Accordingly, we call this the revealed belief model. In another example, an agent outputs the
state θ that she considers most likely according to her current belief. This model can be thought of as
repeated voting (think about papal conclave in the Catholic Church or jury deliberations). In case there
are only two possible states θ ∈ {0, 1}, we refer to it as binary action model. A detailed description of
the model and these examples can be found in Section 2.
The result we present in Section 3 states that it is NP-hard for the agents to compute their actions,
both in the revealed belief and in the binary action model. NP-hardness is a concept from theoretical
computer science that is considered to be rigorous evidence of intractability. One might suspect that
the beliefs can be efficiently approximated, even if they are difficult to compute exactly. However, our
result is robust in that sense, showing hardness of approximation: It is already difficult to distinguish
between posteriors that concentrate almost all of probability on state 0 and those that are concentrated
on state 1. On the other hand, the hardness we show is worst-case: We do not claim that intractable
network structures and private signals are “common” or “likely to arise”. Our reductions rely critically on
the fact that the network structure requires agents to make complicated inferences. We show that known
NP-complete problems can be framed as such inferences about the private information of indirectly
observed agents.
The literature on computational hardness of Bayesian reasoning in social networks is nascent. There
are some hardness results on Bayesian inference in static networks in graphical models and AI (see
Kwisthout (2011) and its references), but these are quite different from models considered in this work.
Papadimitriou and Tsitsiklis (1987) consider partially observed Markov decision processes (POMDP).
These Markovian processes are not directly comparable to our model, but they exhibit similar flavor in
certain respects. Papadimitriou and Tsitsiklis (1987) prove that computing optimal expected utility in a
POMDP is PSPACE-hard. PSPACE-hardness is a stronger notion of intractability than NP-hardness,
but their result does not extend to hardness of approximation. Moreover, the setup for Bayesian decision
making in groups is different (arguably less general, i.e., more challenging for a hardness proof) than
a POMDP. Bayesian group decisions involve a static state of the world; whereas, in a POMDP the
environment undergoes Markovian jumps that depend on the actions of the agents. Subsequently, we
need different techniques to conclude hardness for Bayesian decision making in groups.
Our findings can be interpreted as computational constraints on realizing Aumann-style agreement.
For example, the revealed belief model looks like a sensible protocol for reaching agreement in a network
of cooperative, rational agents. We think of our result as evidence that this protocol might be infeasible
for computationally bounded agents and difficult to simulate using computers. Our results are also of
a totally different flavor than those of Aaronson (2005), who investigates the question of convergence
of beliefs to a consensus and the number of messages (bits) required to be exchanged before one can
guarantee that everybody’s beliefs are close to each other. These results are primarily concerned with
communication complexity and the computational complexity results are limited to two communicating
agents (see also Hanson (2003)).
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In Section 4, we study algorithms for Bayesian decision making in groups and describe a natural search
algorithm to compute agents’ actions in our model. In the context of our hardness results, it is interesting
to note that this algorithm requires both time and memory to be exponential in the size of the network.
If no significant improvement over this method is possible, it would suggest that the intractability of our
problem might be yet greater than implied by NP-hardness.
The Bayesian calculations are formalized as an algorithm for iterated elimination of infeasible signals
(IEIS). This is done in Section 4.1. While the search over the feasible signal profiles in the IEIS algorithm
runs in exponential time, these calculations simplify in certain networks with a particular structure. In
Subsections 4.2 and 4.3, we give examples of efficient algorithms for such cases. As a side result, we
provide a partial answer to one of the questions raised by Mossel and Tamuz (2013), who provide an
efficient algorithm for computing the Bayesian binary actions in a complete graph: we show that efficient
computation is possible for other graphs that have a transitive structure when the action space is finite.
Recursive techniques have been applied to analyze Bayesian decision problems with partial success,
Harel et al. (2014); Kanoria and Tamuz (2013); Mossel et al. (2014); Mossel and Tamuz (2010) and we
contribute to this literature by offering new cases where Bayesian decision making is tractable.
2. THE BAYESIAN GROUP DECISION MODEL
We consider a group of n agents, labeled by [n] = {1, . . . , n}, whose interactions are represented by a
fixed directed graph G. For each agent i ∈ [n], Ni denotes a neighborhood Ni ⊂ [n], whose actions are
observed by agent i. Each agent i ∈ [n] receives a private signal si at the beginning and then engages in
repeated interactions with other group members in discrete time steps.
We model the topic of the discussion/group decision process by a state θ belonging to a finite set Θ. For
example, in the course of a political debate, Θ can be the set of all political parties. The value/identity of
θ is not known to the agents; they all start with a prior belief about the value of θ, which is a probability
distribution over the set Θ with probability mass function ν(·) : Θ → [0, 1]. We assume that this prior
is common to all agents. At each time t, we denote the Bayesian posterior belief of agent i given her
history of observations by its probability mass function µi,t(·) : Θ→ [0, 1]. The private signal si belongs
to a finite set Si and its distribution conditioned on θ is given by Pi,θ(·) which is referred to as the signal
structure of agent i. We use Pθ(·) to denote the joint distribution of the private signals of all agents,
signals being independent across the agents.
Associated with every agent i is an action space Ai that represents the choices available to her at
any time t ∈ N0, and a utility ui(·, ·) : Ai × Θ → R which represents her preferences with respect to
combinations of actions and states.1 At every time t ∈ N, agents i takes action ai,t to maximize her
expected utility, E{ui(ai,t, θ)}, where the expectation is with respect to µi,t. Since this behavior does not
take into account strategic considerations about later rounds, it is sometimes called myopic (Rosenberg
et al., 2009).
Before the process starts, agent i observes her private signal si. At every subsequent time t ≥ 0, she
chooses an action ai,t ∈ Ai, maximizing her expected utility given all her observations up to time t: {aj,τ
for all j ∈ Ni, and τ ≤ t− 1}. Then, she observes the most recent actions of her neighbors, {aj,t for all
j ∈ Ni}, A decision diagram for an example of interaction of two agents is provided in Fig. 1.
1The signal, action, and utility structures, as well as the priors, are all common knowledge among the players. This
common knowledge is also common knowledge etc.
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Figure 1.— The Decision Flow Diagram for Two Bayesian Agents
For each agent i, her history of observations hi,t is an element of the set:
Hi,t = Si ×
∏
j∈Ni
Aj
t .
At every time t, the expected reward to agent i given her choice of action ai and observed history hi,t is
given by the expected reward function ri,t : Ai ×Hi,t → R, as follows:
ri,t(ai,hi,t) = Ei,t {ui(ai, θ) | hi,t} =
∑
θ′∈Θ
ui(ai, θ
′)µi,t(θ′),
for all hi,t ∈ Hi,t, where µi,t(θ′) is the Bayesian posterior of agent i about the truth θ given the observed
history hi,t. The (myopic) optimal action of agent i at time t is then given by ai,t = arg maxai∈Ai ri,t(ai,hi,t).
Here we use the notation arg maxa∈A to include the following tie-breaking rule when the maximizer is
not unique: we assume that all of the action spaces are ordered (arbitrarily) and whenever an agent is
indifferent between a multitude of options she will choose the one that ranks lowest in her ordering.
Our main focus in this paper is on the computational and algorithmic aspects of the group decision
process. Specifically, we will be concerned with the following computational problem:
Problem 1 (GROUP-DECISION) At a time t, given the graph structure G, agent i and the history of
past observation hi,t, determine the Bayesian action ai,t.
2.1. Natural Utility Functions: Binary Action and Revealed Belief
A natural example of a utility function is based on the idea of repeated voting, for example, as
an idealized model of jury deliberations or the papal conclave in the Catholic Church. In this model,
the possible actions correspond to states of the world, i.e., Ai = Θ and the utilities are given by
ui(θ1, θ2) = 1(θ1, θ2). It can be seen that the expected reward of agent i at time t is maximized by choosing
the action that corresponds to the maximum probability in µi,t. In case of binary world Θ = {0, 1}, we will
call this example the binary action model. In another important example, which we will denote as revealed
belief model, the agents reveal their complete posteriors, i.e, µi,t. Formally, label Θ := {θ1, . . . , θm} and
let ej ∈ Rm be a column vector of all zeros except for its j-th element which is equal to one. Furthermore,
we relax the requirement that the action spaces Ai, i ∈ [n] are finite sets; instead, for each agent i ∈ [n] let
Ai be the m-dimensional probability simplex: Ai = {(x1, . . . , xm)T ∈ Rm :
∑m
1 xi = 1 and xi ≥ 0,∀i}.
If the utility assigned to an action a := (a1, . . . , am)T ∈ Ai and a state θj ∈ Θ measures the squared
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Euclidean distance between a and ej , then it is optimal for an agent i at time t to reveal her belief
ai,t = (µi,t(θ1), . . . ,µi,t(θm))
T . We can state a special case of the GROUP-DECISION model in the
revealed belief setting:
Problem 2 (GROUP-DECISION with revealed beliefs) At any time t, given the graph structure G, the
private signal si and the history of observations of neighbors’ beliefs µj,τ , j < t, determine the Bayesian
posterior belief µi,t.
2.2. Log-Likelihood Notation
Consider the finite state space Θ = {θ1, . . . , θm} and for all 2 ≤ k ≤ m, let:
λi(θk) := log
(
Pi,θk(si)
Pi,θ1(si)
)
, φi,t(θk) := log
(
µi,t(θk)
µi,t(θ1)
)
, γ(θk) := log
(
ν(θk)
ν(θ1)
)
.
If we assume the agents start from uniform prior beliefs and the size of the state space is m = 2 (as will
be the case for hardness results in Section 3), we can employ a slightly simpler notation: with uniform
priors γi(θk) = log (νi(θk)/νi(θ1)) = 0 for all i, k, whereas with binary state space Θ = {0, 1}, the agents
need only to keep track of one set of belief and likelihood ratios λi = λi(1) := log (Pi,1(si)/Pi,0(si)), and
φi,t = φi,t(1) = log (µi,t(1)/µi,t(0)).
2.3. Example: First Two Rounds
To give some intuition about our model and illustrate usefulness of the notation defined in Section 2.2
we explain how the agents in the binary action model can compute their actions at two initial times
t = 0 and t = 1. For simplicity, we assume Θ = {0, 1}, uniform prior and binary private signals that are
informative of Θ, that is si ∈ {0, 1} with Pi,1(1) > Pi,0(1). We will focus on computing the log-likelihood
φi,t, since the action ai,t = 1 if and only if φi,t ≥ 0.
At time zero, the posterior and log-likelihood of agent i are given by
µi,0(1) =
Pi,1(si)
Pi,0(si) + Pi,1(si)
, φi,0 = log
(
Pi,1(si)
Pi,0(si)
)
.
Therefore, by our assumption we have ai,0 = si. At time one, agent i observes actions, and therefore also
private signals of her neighbors. Since the private signals are conditionally independent, the respective
log-likelihood ratios add up and we get the following expression:
φi,1 = φi,0 +
∑
j∈Ni
log
(
Pj,1(aj,0)
Pj,0(aj,0)
)
.
However, the computation seems to become significantly more involved at later times. This is because
one needs to account for dependencies and redundancies in agents’ information and resulting actions.
3. HARDNESS OF BAYESIAN DECISIONS
There are many reasons why an economic or sociological model might fail to accurately reflect reality.
As the science of computation rapidly evolves, the computational and cognitive burden of the models
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on agents have received growing attention (see Arora et al. (2011) on computational complexity of
financial derivatives or Velupillai (2000) on the computable foundations of economics). A model cannot
be considered plausible if it requires the participants or agents to perform computations that are believed
to require prohibitively long time.
For most interesting problems that are suspected to be hard it is beyond reach of current techniques to
confirm the suspicion with a complete proof. Instead, computer scientists assume some well-studied and
well-understood problems to be hard and develop a web of reductions between them. Given a widely-
believed-to-be-hard problem A and another problem B, one proves that if there were an efficient method
to solve B, then this method would allow to easily solve A as well. Conversely, if A is hard to compute,
then B must be at least as hard (or harder).
The most important class of problems in those hardness reductions are so called NP-complete prob-
lems. Thousands of NP-complete problems and their variants are known, all equivalent to each other in
terms of efficient reductions. Therefore, either all of them are computationally easy, or all of them are
hard at the same time, with the latter possibility believed by a vast majority of computer scientists. For
a modern introduction to complexity theory and NP-completeness, see, e.g., Arora and Barak (2009).
We show that the GROUP-DECISION problem, both in the binary action and revealed belief models,
is NP-hard. We achieve this by providing a reduction from a problem known to be NP-complete to
GROUP-DECISION. We say that GROUP-DECISION is NP-hard as opposed to NP-complete because
the reduction is one-way: GROUP-DECISION is as hard as NP, but might be strictly harder (in fact,
we strongly suspect this to be indeed the case).
Theorem 1 (Binary action model) The GROUP-DECISION problem in the binary action model is
NP-hard, even with binary private signals an at time t = 2.
Theorem 1 is proved by reduction from an NP-hard problem of approximating vertex cover. A vertex
cover on an undirected graph Gˆm,n with n vertices and m edges is a subset of vertices Σ such that each
edge touches at least one vertex in Σ. It is known that it is NP-hard to distinguish between graphs that
have a vertex cover with, say, at most 0.85n vertices and graphs for which each vertex cover requires at
least 0.999n vertices.
We show an efficient reduction that maps a graph Gˆm,n to an instance of GROUP-DECISION in
the binary action model with binary private signals si ∈ {0, 1}. The underlying graph in the Bayesian
network has size proportional to the size of Gˆm,n. We show that that there exists an agent i such that at
time t = 2:
• If Gˆm,n has a vertex cover of size at most 0.85n, then belief of i is almost entirely concentrated on
θ = 1: µi,2(0) ≤ exp(−Ω(n)). Consequently, the action that i needs to output is ai,2 = 1.
• If every vertex cover of Gˆm,n has size at least 0.999n, then i has the opposite belief µi,2(1) ≤
exp(−Ω(n)) and her action is ai,2 = 0.
Therefore, if it was possible to efficiently compute the action ai,2, it would be also possible to take
a graph Gˆm,n, use the reduction to compute the Bayesian actions, and use the action ai,2 to efficiently
distinguish between graphs with large and small vertex covers. Since this is considered highly implausible
(because it would allow to efficiently solve all NP-complete problems) it provides convincing evidence
that simulating the binary action model requires unrealistic computational resources.
One might suspect that the difficulty of distinguishing between ai,2 = 0 and ai,2 = 1 arises only if the
belief of agent i is very close to the threshold µi,2 ≈ 1/2. However, in our reduction the opposite is true:
For a computationally bounded agent, it is hopeless to distinguish between worlds where θ = 0 with high
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probability (w.h.p.), and θ = 1 w.h.p. This can be thought of as a strong hardness of approximation
result.
On the other hand, our reduction is worst-case. That is, it shows hardness only for a specific class of
networks, and for configurations of private signals that arise with exponentially small probability. 1
Proof sketch of Theorem 1: Appendix A contains a detailed proof. We encode the structure of
Gˆm,n by a two layer network, where the first layer are vertex agents and they are connected to the edge
agents in the second layer based on the incidence relations in Gˆm,n ( See Figure 2, on the left). The vertex
agents τ1, . . . , τn receive Bernoulli private signals such that signal one is an evidence in favor of state one
(i.e., Pτi,1(1) > Pτi,0(1)). Each edge agent observes the actions of its two associated vertex agents (the
private signals of edge agents are uninformative). The probabilities of private signals of vertex agents
are chosen such that for an edge agent εj the action at time one aεj ,1 = 1 if and only if at least one of
two neighboring vertex agents τi received private signal sτi = 1.
Agent i (whose decision is going to be NP-hard) is assumed to observe all edge agents announcing
action aεj ,1 = 1. This means that the private signals of vertex agents form a vertex cover of Gˆm,n. If
all vertex covers of Gˆm,n are larger that 0.999n, then there must be at least 0.999n ones among vertex
private signals, which implies that the log-likelihood of agent i is bounded from below by φi,2 ≥ αn for
some α > 0. On the other hand, if there exists a vertex cover of size 0.85n, then we demonstrate that (for
our choice of private signal probabilities) with high probability the vertex private signals form a smaller
vertex cover of size, say, at most 0.998n. Hence, the log-likelihood φi,2 ≤ βn for some 0 < β < α.
Finally, we add an auxiliary agent κ, observed directly by i, that introduces an independent log-
likelihood with value φκ,1 = −α+β2 n. This means that the final log-likelihood of agent i is φi,2 ≥ α−β2 n > 0
if the graph Gˆm,n has only large vertex covers and φi,2 ≤ −α−β2 n < 0 if there exists a small vertex cover.
Q.E.D.
We also have a matching result for the revealed belief model:
Theorem 2 (Approximating Beliefs) The GROUP-DECISION problem is NP-hard in the revealed
belief model with two states Θ = {0, 1} and binary private signals si ∈ {0, 1}. In particular, on a Bayesian
network with n vertices, it is NP-hard to distinguish at time t = 2 between beliefs µi,t(0) ≤ exp(−Ω(n))
and µi,t(1) ≤ exp(−Ω(n)).
Proof sketch: Appendix B contains a detailed proof. Our reduction is from a variant of an NP-
complete problem EXACT-COVER. Consider a set of n elements Eˆn = {ε1, . . . , εn} and a family of n
subsets of Eˆn denoted by Tˆn = {τ1, . . . , τn}, τj ⊂ Eˆn for all j ∈ [n]. EXACT-COVER is the problem of
deciding if there exists a collection Tˆ ⊆ Tˆn that exactly covers Eˆn, that is, each element εi belongs to
exactly one set in Tˆ . We use a restriction of EXACT-COVER where each set has size three and each
element appears in exactly three sets.
We use a two-layer network to encode the inclusion relations between the elements Eˆn and subsets Tˆn.
There are n agents in the first layer to encode the subsets and n agents in the second layer to encode
the elements. Each element agent observes all the three subset agents corresponding to subsets to which
1One can argue that such networks and configurations are unlikely to arise “in practice”. This is a known phenomenon
in computational complexity, where average-case hardness seems to be much more difficult to demonstrate than worst-case
hardness (see Bogdanov et al. (2006) for a relevant survey). We leave as an open problem to show that GROUP-DECISION
is hard in the average-case sense (e.g., even for a worst-case network, but with “difficult” private signals arising with non-
negligible probability).
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Figure 2.— The graph structure on the left is used for the VERTEX-COVER reduction (Theorem
2); every edge εj is connected to its two vertices, and every vertex is connected to all its incident edges.
The graph structure on the right is used for the EXACT-COVER reduction (Theorem 2); every element
εj belongs to exactly three sets and every set τj contains exactly three elements.
the element belongs (See Fig. 2, on the right). Agent i whose decision problem we show to be NP−hard
observes the reported beliefs of all subset agents. There is also a common auxiliary agent κ observed by
all element agents.
The private signals of agent i and the element agents are non-informative. The subset agents observe
i.i.d. binary signals and the auxiliary agent κ observes another independent binary signal but with a
different distribution. We set up the probabilities of private signals and the beliefs transmitted by the
element agents to i such that there are two possible outcomes. Either sκ = 0 and all subset agents
received positive signals sτi = 1; or, sκ = 1 and the private signals of subset agents form an exact cover
of the elements. Of course, the second alternative is possible only if an exact cover exists.
We choose the signal probabilities in such a way that the first alternative indicates that θ = 1 with
high probability; the second alternative indicates θ = 0 with high probability; and the second alternative
is exponentially more likely to arise (if possible at all). Therefore, if there is no exact cover agent i should
compute µi,2(0) ≈ 0 and otherwise µi,2(1) ≈ 0.
Q.E.D.
4. ALGORITHMS FOR BAYESIAN CHOICE
Refinement of information partitions with increasing observations is a key feature of rational learning
problems and it is fundamental to major classical results that establish agreement (Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis (1982)) or learning (Blackwell and Dubins (1962); Lehrer and Smorodinsky (1996)) among
rational agents. 1
1Several follow-up works of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) have extended different aspects of information
exchange among rational agents. In this line of work, it is of particular interest to derive conditions that ensure the
refinement of information partitions would lead to the consensus on and/or the common knowledge of an aggregate decision.
Some notable examples include the works of Bacharach (1985); Cave (1983); Parikh and Krasucki (1990), which consider
information exchange by repeatedly reporting the values of a general set function f(·) over the state space (rather than
the conditional probabilities, which are the Bayesian beliefs). Bacharach (1985); Cave (1983) propose a condition of union
consistency on f(·) and Parikh and Krasucki (1990) replace this union consistency condition with a convexity property for
f(·), all ensuring that the value of f(·) become common knowledge among the agents after repeated exchanges.
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In Section 4.1, we describe a recursive implementation for the refinement of the information sets
(partitions) that relies on iterated elimination of infeasible signals (IEIS) for all the agents. The IEIS
calculations scale exponentially with the network size; this is true across the network with the exception of
some very well-connected agents who have, indeed, direct access to all the observations of their neighbors
and can thus analyze the decisions of each of their neighbors based on their respective observations. We
expand on this special case (called transitive networks) in Section 4.2 and explain how the Bayesian
calculations simplify as a result. Finally, in Sections 4.3 and 4.3.1 we discuss networks that allow efficient
computation in the revealed beliefs case.
4.1. Iterated Elimination of Infeasible Signals (IEIS)
In this section we describe a natural method of computing agents’ actions. It proceeds by iterative
refinement of partitions of the space of private signals. As such, we denote this approach as “Iterated
Elimination of Infeasible Signals” (IEIS).
To proceed, let s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S1 × . . .×Sn be any profile of initial signals observed by each agent
across the network, and denote the set of all private signal profiles that agent i regards as feasible at time
t, i.e. her information set at time t, by I i,t ⊂ S1× . . .×Sn; this set is a random set, as it is determined by
the random privates signals of the agents. Starting from I i,0 = {si} ×
∏
j 6=i Sj , at every decision epoch
agent i removes those signal profiles in I i,t−1 that are inconsistent with her history of observations hi,t
and constructs a censured set of signal profiles I i,t ⊂ I i,t−1 to form her Bayesian posterior belief and
make her decision at time t. The set of feasible signals I i,t is mapped to a Bayesian posterior for agent
i at time t as follows:
µi,t(θ) =
∑
s∈Ii,t Pθ(s)ν(θ)∑
θ′∈Θ
∑
s∈Ii,t Pθ′(s)ν(θ
′)
,(4.1)
which in turn enables the agent to choose an optimal (myopic) action given her observations:1
ai,t = arg max
ai∈Ai
∑
θ′∈Θ
ui(ai, θ
′)µi,t(θ′).(4.2)
Crucially, apart from her own feasible set I i,t, in IEIS, agent i keeps track of all possible feasible sets
Ij,t(s) for all agents j and all private signal profiles s. For any agent j 6= i and at every signal profile s,
let I(i)j,t(s) be the set of all signal profiles that agent i believes have not yet been rejected by agent j, given
all her observations and conditioned on the initial private signals being s. Consider the feasible action
calculated by agent i for agent j under the assumption that the initial private signals are prescribed by
s = (s1, . . . , sn), i.e.
a
(i)
j,τ (s) = arg max
aj∈Aj
∑
θ′∈Θ
uj(aj , θ
′)
∑
s′∈I(i)j,τ (s)
Pθ′(s′)ν(θ′)∑
θ′′∈Θ
∑
s′∈I(i)j,τ (s)
Pθ′′(s′)ν(θ′′)
, ∀τ ∈ [t],(4.3)
where I(i)j,τ (s) is defined in Table I. Given a(i)j,t(s) for all s ∈ I i,t−1 and every j ∈ Ni, the agent can reject
any s for which the observed neighboring action aj,t for some j ∈ Ni does not agree with the simulated
feasible action conditioned on s: aj,t 6= a(i)j,t(s). To proceed, we introduce the notation N τi as the τ -th
1In this sense, the Bayesian posterior is a sufficient statistic for the history of observations and unlike the observation
history, it does not grow in dimension with time.
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TABLE I
List of the variables that play a role in the Bayesian calculations for group decision-making
(BAYES-GROUP).
s s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) ∈ S1 × . . .× Sn is a profile of initial private signals.
Ii,t Ii,t ⊂ S1 × . . . × Sn is the list of all signal profiles that are deemed feasible by agent i, given her
observations up until time t.
I(i)j,t (s) I(i)j,t (s) ⊂ S1 × . . .× Sn is the list of all signal profiles that agent i believes are deemed feasible by agent
j, given what agent i believes agent j could have observed up until time t conditioned on the event that
the initial signals of all agents are prescribed according to s.
a
(i)
j,t(s) a
(i)
j,t(s) ∈ Aj is the action that agent i deems optimal for agent j, given what agent i believes agent j
could have observed up until time t conditioned on the event that the initial signals of all agents are
prescribed according to s.
order neighborhood of agent i comprising entirely of those agents who are connected to agent i through
a walk of length τ : N τi = {j ∈ [n] : j ∈ Ni1 , i1 ∈ Ni2 , . . . , iτ−1 ∈ Niτ , iτ = i, for some i1, . . . , iτ−1 ∈ [n]};
in particular, N 1i = Ni and we use the convention N 0i = {i}. We further denote N¯ ti := ∪tτ=0N τi as the
set of all agents who are within distance t of or closer to agent i; we sometimes refer to N¯ ti as her t-radius
ego-net.
We now describe the calculations that agent i undertakes at every time t to update her list of feasible
signal profiles from I i,t to I i,t+1: agent i initializes her list of feasible signals I i,0 = {si} ×
∏
j 6=i Sj ;
at time t she would have access to I i,t, the list of feasible signal profiles that are consistent with her
observations, as well as all signal profiles that she thinks each of the other agents would regard as feasible
conditioned on any profile of initial signals: I(i)j,t−τ (s) for all s ∈ S1× . . .×Sn, all j ∈ N τi , and all τ ∈ [t].
Calculations of agent i at time t enables her to update her information at time t to incorporate the newly
obtained data which constitute her observations of neighbors’ most recent actions aj,t for all j ∈ Ni;
whence she refines I i,t to I i,t+1 and updates her belief and actions accordingly, cf. (4.1) and (4.2). This
is achieved as follows (we use δ(j, i) to denote the length of the shortest path connecting j to i):
(I1: BAYES-GROUP). The information available to agent i at time t:
• I(i)j,t−τ (s) for all s ∈ S1 × . . .× Sn, all j ∈ N τi , and all τ ∈ [t].
• I i,t, i.e. all signal profiles that she regards as feasible given her observations.
(A1: BAYES-GROUP). Calculations of agent i at time t for deciding ai,t+1:
1. For all s := (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S1 × . . .× Sn and all j ∈ N t+1i do:
• If δ(j, i) = t+ 1, initialize I(i)j,0(s) = {sj} ×
∏
k 6=j Sk.
• Else initialize I(i)j,t+1−δ(j,i)(s) = I
(i)
j,t−δ(j,i)(s) and for all s
′ ∈ I(i)j,t+1−δ(j,i)(s) do:
– For all k ∈ Nj if a(i)k,t−τ (s′) 6= a(i)k,t−τ (s), then I(i)j,t+1−τ (s) = I(i)j,t+1−τ (s) \ {s′}, where
a
(i)
k,t−τ (s
′) and a(i)k,t−τ (s) are calculated using (4.3), based on I(i)k,t−τ (s′) and I(i)k,t−τ (s).
2. Initialize I i,t+1 = I i,t and for all s ∈ I i,t+1 do:
• For all j ∈ Ni if aj,t 6= a(i)j,t(s), then I i,t+1 = I i,t+1 \ {s}.
In Appendix C we describe the complexity of the computations that the agent should undertake using
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Figure 3.— A structure with bounded growth: each agent is influenced by no more than three other
agents even as the network (organization) size grows to infinity.
(A1) at any time t in order to calculate her posterior probability µi,t+1 and Bayesian decision ai,t+1
given all her observations up to time t. Subsequently, we prove that:
Theorem 3 (Complexity of IEIS) Consider a network of size n with m states, and let M and A denote
the maximum cardinality of the signal and action spaces (m := card(Θ), M = maxk∈[n] card(Sk),and
A = maxk∈[n] card(Ak)). The IEIS algorithm has O(n2M2n−1mA) running time, which given the private
signal of agent i and the previous actions of her neighbors {aj,τ : j ∈ Ni, τ < t} in any network structure,
calculates ai,t, the updated action of agent i at time t.
Remark 1 (Structure and Complexity in Decision Making Organizations) Suppose the cardinality of
the set of agents who influence the decisions of agent i (her cone of influence) remains bounded with the
network size, i.e., N¯ ni ≤ D for some fixed D ∈ N. In such structures, where the growth is bounded, the
Bayesian computations using (A1) become polynomial, upon replacing n with fixed D in (C.2). Such
bounded structures can, for example, arise as a result of horizontal growth in organizations as shown in
Fig. 3.1
4.2. IEIS over Transitive Structures
We now shift focus to the special case of transitive networks, defined below.
Definition 1 (Transitive Networks) We call a network structure transitive if the directed neighborhood
relationship between its nodes satisfies the reflexive and transitive properties. In particular, the transitive
property implies that anyone whose actions indirectly influences the observations of agent i is also directly
observed by her, i.e. any neighbor of a neighbor of agent i is a neighbor of agent i as well.2
1The question of structure and its relation to performance receive considerable attention in organization studies.
Through a series of seminal papers, Sah and Stiglitz (1985, 1986, 1988) popularized a model of project selection in organi-
zations to study the effect of their structures, and in particular to compare the performance of hierarchies and polyarchies.
Christensen and Knudsen (2010) consider the optimal decision making structures for reducing the probability of two error
types in project evaluation tasks (rejecting profitable projects, type I error, or accepting unprofitable ones, type II error).
They point out that either of the hierarchical or polyarchical organization structures are suitable for reducing one error
type and they can be combined optimally to produce good overall performance. They further study the incremental im-
provement from the addition of new decision-makers and point out that polyarchical structures allow for the information
to propagate throughout the organization, while in hierarchical organizations most information is filter out on the way to
the top. Therefore, from a complexity standpoint, extending hierarchies to accommodate new members can lead to better
tractability with the increasing organization size.
2We can regard the directed neighborhood relationship as a binary relation on the set of vertices: i is in relation RN
with j iff j ∈ Ni. Then the transitive property would ensure that RN is a transitive relation on the set of vertices.
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TABLE II
List of the variables for Bayesian calculations in transitive groups (BAYES-transitive).
Si,t Si,t ⊂ Si is the list of all private signals that are deemed feasible for agent i at time t, by an agent who
has observed her actions in a transitive network structure up until time t.
ai,t(si) ai,t(si) ∈ Ai is the optimal choice of agent i at time t, given her observations until time t conditioned
on the event that her initial private is si.
Ii,t(si) Ii,t(si) = {si} ×∏j∈Ni Sj,t is the list of all signal profiles that are deemed feasible by agent i for her
neighbors, given her observations of their actions up until time t conditioned on own private signal being
si.
In such structures, any agent whose actions indirectly influences the observations of agent i is also
directly observed by her. This special structure of transitive networks mitigates the issue of hidden
observations, and as a result, Bayesian inferences in a transitive structure are significantly less complex.
Note from Table II that agent i needs only to keep track of Sj,t ⊆ Sj for all j ∈ Ni, i.e. the private
signals that she deems feasible for each of her neighbors individually. The transitive structure allows
the list of feasible signal profiles at time t to be decomposed according to the signals that are feasible
for each of the neighbors individually, i.e. I i,t = {si} ×
∏
j∈Ni Sj,t; the updating is thus achieved by
incorporating the respective actions aj,t for each j ∈ Ni individually and transforming the respective
Sj,t into Sj,t+1. Agent i could then refine her belief and come up with improved recommendations based
on (4.1) and (4.2). After initializing Sj,0 = Sj for all j ∈ Ni and I i,0 = {si} ×
∏
j∈Ni Sj,0, at any time
t the transformation from I i,t into I i,t+1 in a transitive structure can be achieved as follows:
(I2: BAYES-TRANSITIVE). The information available to agent i at time t:
• Sj,t ⊂ Sj for all j ∈ Ni is the list of private signals that agent i deems feasible for her neighbor
j ∈ Ni given her observations up to time t.
(A2: BAYES-TRANSITIVE). Calculations of agent i at time t for deciding ai,t+1 in a transitive
network:
1. For all j ∈ Ni do:
• Initialize Sj,t+1 = Sj,t, and for all sj ∈ Sj,t+1 do:
– Calculate aj,t(sj) given Ij,t(sj) = {sj} ×
∏
k∈Nj Sk,t.
– If aj,t 6= aj,t(sj), then set Sj,t+1 = Sj,t+1 \ {sj}.
2. Update I i,t+1 = {si} ×
∏
j∈Ni Sj,t+1.
In Appendix D, we determine the computational complexity of (A2:BAYES-transitive) as follows:
Theorem 4 (Efficient Bayesian group decisions in transitive structures) Consider a network of size
n with m states, and let M and A denote the maximum cardinality of the signal and action spaces
(m := card(Θ), M = maxk∈[n] card(Sk),and A = maxk∈[n] card(Ak)). There exists an algorithm with
running time O(Amn2M2) which given the private signal of agent i and the previous actions of her
neighbors {aj,τ : j ∈ Ni, τ < t} in any transitive network, calculates ai,t, the updated action of agent i at
time t.
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4.3. Algorithms for Beliefs
In general, GROUP-DECISION with revealed beliefs is a hard problem per Theorem 2. Here, we
introduce a special class of structures which lead to efficient belief calculations in the revealed belief
model. Recall that the t-radius ego-net of agent i, N¯ ti , is the set of all agents who are within distance t
of or closer to agent i:
Definition 2 (Transparency) The graph structure G is transparent if for all agents i ∈ [n] and all
times t we have that: φi,t =
∑
j∈N¯ ti λj, for any choice of signal structures and all possible initial signals.
Moreover, we call G transparent to agent i at time t, if for all j ∈ Ni and every τ ≤ t− 1 we have that:
φj,τ =
∑
k∈N¯ τj λk, for any choice of signal structures and all possible initial signals.
In transparent networks, the initial belief exchanges reveal the likelihoods of the private signals in the
neighboring agents. Hence, from her observations of the beliefs of her neighbors at time zero {µj,0, j ∈
Ni}, agent i learns all that she ever needs to know regarding the private signals of her neighbors so far
as they influence her beliefs about the unknown state θ.
Corollary 1 (Transparency at time one) All graphs are transparent at time one.
However, the future neighboring beliefs (at time one and beyond) are less “transparent” when it comes
to reflecting the neighbors’ knowledge of other private signals that are received throughout the network.
In particular, the time one beliefs of the neighbors φj,1, j ∈ Ni is given by φj,1 =
∑
k∈N¯ 1j λk; hence, from
observing the time one belief of a neighbor, agent i would only get to know
∑
k∈Nj λk, rather than the
individual values of λk for each k ∈ Nj .1
Remark 2 (Transparency, statistical efficiency, and impartial inference) Such agents j whose beliefs
satisfy the equation in Definition 2 at some time τ are said to hold a transparent or efficient belief;
the latter signifies the fact that the such a belief coincides with the Bayesian posterior if agent j were
given direct access to the private signals of every agent in N¯ τj . This is indeed the best possible (or
statistically efficient) belief that agent j can hope to form given the information available to her at time
τ . The same connection to the statistically efficient beliefs arise in the work of Eyster and Rabin (2014)
who formulate the closely related concept of “impartial inference” in a model of sequential decisions by
different players in successive rounds; accordingly, impartial inference ensures that the full informational
content of all signals that influence a player’s beliefs can be extracted and players can fully (rather than
partially) infer their predecessors’ signals. In other words, under impartial inference, players’ immediate
predecessors provide “sufficient statistics” for earlier movers that are indirectly observed (Eyster and
Rabin, 2014, Section 3). Last but not least, it is worth noting that statistical efficiency or impartial
inference are properties of the posterior beliefs, and as such the signal structures may be designed so
that statistical efficiency or impartial inference hold true for a particular problem setting; on the other
hand, transparency is a structural property of the network and would hold true for any choice of signal
structures and all possible initial signals.
1This is a fundamental aspect of inference problems in observational learning (in learning from other actors): similar
to responsiveness that Ali (2014) defines as a property of the utility functions to determine whether players’ beliefs can be
inferred from their actions, transparency in our belief exchange setup is defined as a property of the graph structure (see
Remark 2 on why transparency is a structural property) which determines to what extent other players’ private signals
can be inferred from observing the neighboring beliefs.
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The following is a sufficient graphical condition for agent i to hold an efficient (transparent) belief at
time t: there are no agents k ∈ N¯ ti that has multiple paths to agent i, unless it is among her neighbors
(agent k is directly observed by agent i).
Proposition 1 (Graphical condition for transparency) Agent i will hold a transparent (efficient) belief
at time t if there are no k ∈ N¯ ti \Ni such that for j 6= j′, both j and j′ belonging to Ni, we have k ∈ N¯ t−1j
and k ∈ N¯ t−1j′ .
Proof: The proof follows by induction on t, i.e. by considering the agents whose information reach
agent i for the first time at t. The claim is trivially true at time one, since agent i can always infer the
likelihoods of the private signals of each of her neighbors by observing their beliefs at time one. Now
consider the belief of agent i at time t, the induction hypothesis implies that φi,t−1 =
∑
k∈N¯ t−1i λk,
as well as φj,t−1 =
∑
k∈N¯ t−1j λk and φj,t−2 =
∑
k∈N¯ t−2j λk for all j ∈ Ni. To form her belief at time
t (or equivalently its log-ratio φi,t), agent i should consider her most recent information {φj,t−1 =∑
k∈N¯ t−1j λk, j ∈ Ni} and use that to update her current belief φi,t−1 =
∑
k∈N¯ t−2i λk. To prove the
induction claim, it suffices to show that agent i has enough information to calculate the sum of log-
likelihood ratios of all signals in her t-radius ego-net, N¯ ti ; i.e. to form φi,t =
∑
k∈N¯ ti λk. This is the best
possible belief that she can hope to achieve at time t, and it is the same as her Bayesian posterior, had
she direct access to the private signals of all agents in her t-radius ego-net. To this end, by using her
knowledge of φj,t−1 and φj,t−2 she can form:
φˆj,t−1 = φj,t−1 − φj,t−2 =
∑
k∈N¯ t−1j \N¯ t−2j
λk,
for all j ∈ Ni. Since, φi,t−1 =
∑
k∈N¯ t−1i λk by the induction hypothesis, the efficient belief φi,t =∑
k∈N¯ ti λk can be calculated if and only if,
φˆi,t = φi,t − φi,t−1 =
∑
k∈N¯ ti \N¯ t−1i
λk,(4.4)
can be computed. In the above formulation φˆi,t is an innovation term, representing the information that
agent i learns from her most recent observations at time t. We now show that under the assumption that
any agent with multiple paths to an agent i is directly observed by her, the innovation term in (4.4) can
be constructed from the knowledge of φj,t−1 =
∑
k∈N¯ t−1j λk, and φj,t−2 =
∑
k∈N¯ t−2j λk for all j ∈ Ni;
indeed, we show that:
φˆi,t =
∑
j∈Ni
φˆj,t−1 − ∑
k∈Ni:
δ(k,j)=t−1
φk,0
 , for all t > 1.(4.5)
Consider any k ∈ N¯ ti \N¯ t−1i , these are all agents which are at distance exactly t, t > 1, from agent i, and
no closer to her. No such k ∈ N¯ ti \ N¯ t−1i is a direct neighbor of agent i and the structural assumption
therefore implies that there is a unique neighbor of agent i, call this unique neighbor jk ∈ Ni, satisfying
k ∈ N¯ t−1jk \ N¯ t−2jk . On the other hand, consider any j ∈ Ni and some k ∈ N¯ t−1j \ N¯ t−2j , such an agent
k is either a neighbor of i or else at distance exactly t > 1 from agent i and therefore k ∈ N¯ ti \ N¯ t−1i ,
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and element j would be the unique neighbor jk ∈ Ni satisfying k ∈ N¯ t−1jk \ N¯ t−2jk . Subsequently, we can
partition
N¯ ti \ N¯ t−1i = unionmultij∈NiN¯ t−1j \
(
N¯ t−2j ∪Ni
)
,
and therefore we can rewrite the left-hand side of (4.4) as follows:
φˆi,t =
∑
k∈
N¯ ti \N¯ t−1i
λk =
∑
k∈unionmultij∈Ni
N¯ t−1j \(N¯ t−2j ∪Ni)
λk =
∑
j∈Ni
∑
k∈N¯ t−1j \
(N¯ t−2j ∪Ni)
λk
=
∑
j∈Ni

∑
k∈N¯ t−1j \
N¯ t−2j
λk −
∑
k∈Ni∩
N¯ t−1j \N¯ t−2j
λk
 =
∑
j∈Ni
φˆj,t−1 − ∑
k∈Ni:
δ(k,j)=t−1
φk,0
 ,
as claimed in (4.5), completing the proof. Q.E.D.
Note that in the course of the proof of Proposition 1, for the structures that satisfy the sufficient
condition for transparency, we obtain a simple (and efficient) algorithm for updating beliefs by setting
the total innovation at every step equal to the sum of the most recent innovations observed at each of
the neighbors, correcting for those neighbors who are being recounted:
(A3: CORRECTED-INNOVATIONS). Calculations of agent i at time t for deciding
µi,t+1 in a structure that satisfies Proposition 1:
1. Initialize:
• φi,0 = λi,
• φˆj,0 = φj,0 = λj ,
• φi,1 =
∑
j∈N¯ 1i φj,0.
2. m For t > 1 do:
• φˆj,t−1 = φj,t−1 − φj,t−2,
• φˆi,t =
∑
j∈Ni
[φˆj,t−1 −
∑
k∈Ni:δ(k,j)=t−1
φk,0],
• φi,t = φi,t−1 + φˆi,t.
Rooted (directed) trees are a special class of transparent structures, which also satisfy the sufficient
structural condition of Proposition 1; indeed, in case of a rooted tree for any agent k that is indirectly
observed by agent i, there is a unique path connecting k to i. As such the correction terms for the sum of
innovations observed in the neighbors is always zero, and we have φˆi,t =
∑
j∈Ni φˆj,t−1, i.e. the innovation
at every time step is equal to the total innovations observed in all the neighbors.
Example 1 (Transparent structures) Fig. 4 illustrates cases of transparent and nontransparent struc-
tures. We refer to them as first, second, third, and forth in their respective order from left to right.
All structures except the first one are transparent. To see how the transparency is violated in the first
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structure, consider the beliefs of agent i: φi,0 = λi, φi,1 = λi + λj1 + λj2 ; at time two, agent 1 observes
φj1,1 = λj1 + λk1 + λk2 and φj2,1 = λj2 + λk2 + λk3 . Knowing φj1,0 = λj1 and φj2,0 = λj2 she can infer
the value of the two sub-sums λk1 +λk2 and λk1 +λk3 , but there is no way for her to infer their total sum
λj1 +λj2 +λk1 +λk2 +λk3 . Agent i cannot hold an efficient or transparent belief at time two. The issue
is resolved in the second structure by adding a direct link so that agent k2 is directly observed by agent
i; the sufficient structural condition of Proposition 1 is thus satisfied and we have φi,2 = λi+λj1 +λj2 +
λk1 +λk2 +λk3 . In structure three, we have φi,2 = λi+λj1 +λj2 +λk1 +λk2 = λi+φj1,1+φj2,0. Structure
four is also transparent and we have φi,2 = λi + λj1 + λj2 + λk1 + λk2 + λk3 + λk4 = λi + φj1,1 + φj2,1
and φi,3 = λi +λj1 +λj2 +λk1 +λk2 +λk3 +λk4 +λl = λi +φj1,1 +φj2,1 + (φj1,2−φj1,1), where in the
last equality we have used the fact that λl = (φj1,2−φj1,1). In particular, note that structures three and
four violate the sufficient structural condition laid out in Proposition 1, despite both being transparent.
Figure 4.— The last three structures are transparent but the first one is not.
4.3.1. Efficient Belief Calculations in Transparent Structures
Here we describe calculations of a Bayesian agent in a transparent structure. Since the network is
transparent to agent i, she has access to the following information from the beliefs that she has observed
in her neighbors at times τ ≤ t, before deciding her belief for time t+ 1:
• Her own signal si and its log-likelihood λi.
• Her observations of the neighboring beliefs: {µj,τ : j ∈ Ni, τ ≤ t}.
Due to transparency, the neighboring beliefs reveal the following information about sums of log-
likelihoods of private signals of subsets of other agents in the network:
∑
k∈N¯ τj λk = φi,τ , for all τ ≤
t, and any j ∈ Ni. To decide her belief, agent i constructs the following system of linear equations in
card
(N¯t+1)+ 1 unknowns: {λj : j ∈ N¯t+1, and λ¯i,t+1}, where λ¯i,t+1 = ∑j∈N¯t+1 λj is the best possible
(statistically efficient) belief for agent i at time t+ 1:
∑
k∈N¯ τj λk = φj,τ , for all τ ≤ t, and any j ∈ Ni,∑
j∈N¯ t+1i λj − λ¯i,t+1 = 0.
(4.6)
Transparency guarantees that (4.6) is solvable for λ¯i,t+1: in transparent structures λ¯i,t+1 can be de-
termined uniquely so that φi,t+1 = λ¯i,t+1, is not only statistically efficient but also computationally
efficient. For a transparent structure the complexity of determining the Bayesian posterior belief at time
t + 1 is the same as the complexity of performing Gauss-Jordan steps which is O(n3) for solving the
t . card(Ni) equations in card(N¯ t+1i ) unknowns. Note that here we make no attempt to optimize these
computations beyond the fact that their growth is polynomial in n.1
1This is an interesting alignment that emerges between statistical and computational efficiency in group decision process,
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Note that it is possible for agent i to determine the sum of log-likelihoods of signals of agents in
her higher-order neighborhoods even though she does not learn about each signal likelihood individ-
ually.indeed, this was the case for agent i in the forth (transparent) structure of Example 1: agent
i learns {λi,λj1 ,λj2 ,λk1 + λk2 ,λk3 + λk4 ,λl} and in particular can determine the efficient beliefs
λ¯i,2 = λi + λj1 + λj2 + λk1 + λk2 + λk3 + λk4 and λ¯i,3 = λi + λj1 + λj2 + λk1 + λk2 + λk3 + λk4 + λl,
but she never learns the actual values of the likelihoods {λk1 ,λk2 ,λk3 ,λk4}, individually.
In a transparent structure, in the reduced row echelon form, λ¯i,t is a basic variable with fixed value
(its corresponding column has a unique non-zero element that is a one, and that one belongs to a row
with all zero elements except itself), then she sets her belief optimally such that φi,t+1 = λ¯i,t+1; this is
the statistically efficient belief at time t + 1. Recall that in the case of a binary state space, log-belief
ratio φi,t+1 uniquely determines the belief µi,t+1.
Next we consider the case where λ¯i,t+1 is not a basic variable in the reduced row echelon form of system
(4.6) or it is a basic variable but its value is not fixed by the system and depends on how the free variables
are set. In such cases the graph is no transparent since agent i does not have access to the statistically
efficient belief λ¯i,t+1. However, such a graph is still transparent to agent i. Following the IEIS procedure
of Section 4.1, let us denote the set of feasible signal profiles for agent i at time t by I i,t. The general
strategy of agent i, would be to search over all elements of I i,t and to eliminate (refute) any signal profile
s¯ that is inconsistent with (i.e. does not satisfy) theNi new equations revealed to her from the transparent
beliefs of her neighbors. For a signal profile s¯ = (s1, s2, . . . , sn), let λi(s) := log(Pi,θ2(si)/Pi,θ1(si)) denote
the log-likelihood ratio of its i-th component private signal. Given the list of feasible signal profiles I i,t
for agent i at time t, we formalize the calculations of agent i, subject to observation of the transparent
beliefs of her neighbors φj,t, j ∈ Ni, as follows:
1. Initialize I i,t+1 = I i,t.
2. For all s ∈ I i,t+1 and any j ∈ Ni do:
• If φj,t 6=
∑
k∈N¯ tj λk(s), then set I i,t+1 = I i,t+1 \ {s}.
3. Given I i,t+1, calculate the updated belief µi,t+1 according to (4.1).
In general there is an exponential number of feasible signal profiles and verifying them for the new Ni
equations would take exponential time. For example in leftmost structure of Fig. 4, agent i will not hold
a transparent belief at time 2 but she can determine the sub-sum λi + λj1 + λj2 and her belief would
involve a search only over the profile of the signals of the remaining agents (sk1 , sk2 , sk3). At time two,
she finds all (sk1 , sk2 , sk3) that agree with the additionally inferred sub-sums φj1,1 − φj1,0 = λk1 + λk2
and φj2,1 − φj2,0 = λk2 + λk3 ; indeed we can express φi,2 as follows:
φi,2 = λi + λj1 + λj2 + log
∑
(sk1 ,sk2 ,sk3 )∈Ii,2 Pk1,θ2(sk1)Pk2,θ2(sk2)Pk3,θ2(sk3)∑
(sk1 ,sk2 ,sk3 )∈Ii,2 Pk1,θ1(sk1)Pk2,θ1(sk2)Pk3,θ1(sk3)
,
and it is in contrast with the trade-off between statistical and computational performance that is reported in other graphical
inference problems such as sparse principal component analysis, planted partition and stochastic block models, as well as
sub-matrix localization, where there is an “information-computation gap” between what is achievable in polynomial-time
and what is statistically optimal (achieves the information theoretic limit); cf. Chen and Xu (2016); Wang et al. (2016).
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where
I i,2 = {(sk1 , sk2 , sk3) : log
Pk1,θ2(sk1)
Pk1,θ1(sk1)
+ log
Pk2,θ2(sk2)
Pk2,θ1(sk2)
= λk1 + λk2 , and
log
Pk1,θ2(sk1)
Pk1,θ1(sk1)
+ log
Pk3,θ2(sk3)
Pk3,θ1(sk3)
= λk2 + λk3}.
In general non-transparent cases, the neighboring beliefs are highly non-linear functions of the log-
likelihoods and the above forward reasoning approach can no longer be applied; indeed, when trans-
parency is violated then beliefs represent what signal profiles agents regard as feasible rather than what
they know about the log-likelihoods of signals of others whom they have directly or indirectly observed.
In particular, the agent cannot use the reported beliefs of the neighbors directly to make inferences about
the original causes of those reports which are the private signals. Instead, to keep track of the feasible
signal profiles that are consistent with her observations the agent employs a version of the IEIS algorithm
of Section 4.1 that is tailored to the case of revealed beliefs.
5. CONCLUSIONS, OPEN PROBLEMS, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We proved hardness results for computing Bayesian actions and approximating posterior beliefs in a
model of decision making in groups (Theorems 1 and 2). We further augmented these hardness results by
offering special cases where Bayesian calculations simplify and efficient computation of Bayesian actions
and posterior beliefs is possible (transitive and transparent networks).
A potential future research direction is to develop a satisfactory theory of rational information ex-
change in light of computational constraints. It would be interesting to reconcile our negative results
with more positive picture presented by Aaronson (2005) and Hanson (2003). Less ambitiously, a more
exact characterization of computational hardness for different network and utility structures is certainly
possible. Development of an average-case complexity result would be particularly interesting.
Another major direction is to investigate other configurations and structures for which the computation
of Bayesian actions is achievable in polynomial-time, in particular, to develop tight conditions on the
network structure that result in necessary and sufficient conditions for transparency. It is also of interest
to know the quality of information aggregation; i.e. under what conditions on the signal structure and
network topology, Bayesian actions coincide with the best action given the aggregate information of all
agents.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF THEOREM 1: VERTEX COVER REDUCTION
Our reduction is from hardness of approximation for VERTEX-COVER.
Definition 3 (Vertex Cover of a Graph) Given a graph Gˆm,n = (Vˆ, Eˆ), with |Eˆ | = m edge and |Vˆ| = n
nodes, a vertex cover Σ is a subset of vertices such that every edge of Gˆm,n is incident to at least one
vertex in Σ. Let Ξˆ denote the set of all vertex covers of Gˆm,n.
Problem 3 (VERTEX-COVER) Given a simple graph Gˆm,n with n vertices and m edges, it is NP-hard
to distinguish between:
• YES case: there exists a vertex cover Σ of size |Σ| ≤ 0.85n.
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• NO case: each vertex cover Σ has size |Σ| ≥ 0.999n.1
Consider the graph input Gˆm,n to the vertex cover problem, which has m edges and n vertices. We
encode the structure of Gˆm,n by a two layer network, where the first layer are the n vertex agents
τ1, . . . , τn and they are connected to the m edge agents ε1, . . . , εm in the second layer based on the
incidence relations in Gˆm,n (See Figure 2). Each vertex agent τ receives a private binary signal sτ such
that:
Pτ,1{sτ = 1} = 1− Pτ,1{sτ = 0} = 0.4 =: p,
Pτ,0{sτ = 1} = 1− Pτ,0{sτ = 0} = 0.3 =: p.
We analyze the decision problem for the agent i who observes the actions of edge agents. We assume
that the private signals of agent i and the edge agents ε1, . . . , εm all observe non-informative private
signals. There is also a special agent κ that is directly observed by agent i and her signal structure will
be specified later.
We consider computing action of agent i if all edge agents claim aε,1 = 1 and κ claims aκ,0 = 0.
Consider any edge agent ε and let ε(1) and ε(2) be the corresponding vertex agents whose actions are
observed by agent ε. At time one, agent ε observes the actions of her neighboring (vertex) agents: aε(1),0
and aε(2),0. Under the assumed signal and utility structure, any vertex agent τ that observes sτ = 1 will
announce her private signal at the initial step: aτ,0 = sτ since each signal sτ = 0 or sτ = 1 is more
probable under its respective state θ = 0 or θ = 1. We now consider the action of the edge agent ε
after she observes the actions (i.e. private signals) of her neighboring vertex agents, aε(1),0 and aε(2),0.
We distinguish two cases: (i) if aε(1),0 = aε(2),0, then aε,1 = aε(1),0 = aε(2),0. (ii) if aε(1),0 6= aε(2),0, then it
should be that one vertex agent has received a one signal and the other one has received a zero signal.
Therefore the posterior over θ = 1 at time one is given by:
µε,1(1) =
p¯1(1− p¯1)
p¯1(1− p¯1) + p1(1− p1)
=
(0.4)(0.6)
(0.4)(0.6) + (0.3)(0.7)
>
1
2
.
Therefore aε,1 = 1, whenever aε(1),0 6= aε(2),0. In particular, we have the following fact:
Fact 1 The edge agents announce 1 at time t = 1 if, and only if, at least one of their neighboring
vertex agents have reported a one signal to them: aε,1 = 1{sε(1) = 1 or sε(2) = 1}.
The following observation follows from Fact 1 and it is crucial for setting up a reduction from the
VERTEX-COVER (Problem 3):
Fact 2 Σ := {τ ∈ Vˆ : sτ = 1} is a vertex cover for graph Gˆm,n = (Vˆ, Eˆ) if, and only if, aε,1 = 1 for all
ε ∈ Eˆ.
We are interested in the decision problem for agent i at time 2, given that she has observed aε,1 = 1
for all ε ∈ Eˆ . According to Fact 2, the observation that aε,1 = 1,∀ε ∈ Eˆ is equivalent to the private
signals of the vertex agents constituting a vertex cover. Hence, we denote the set of all vertex agents
who observe a one by Σ := {τ ∈ Vˆ : sτ = 1} and think of private signals sτ = 1, τ ∈ Vˆ, as a set with
size |Σ| = αnn, αn ∈ { 1n , 2n , . . . , n−1n , 1}. For any such set Σ we have:
1 Recent series of works culminating in Khot et al. (2018) establishedNP-hardness for YES case with |Σ| ≤ (√2/2+)n,
and NO case with |Σ| ≥ (1− )n for any  > 0. The parameters we chose are good enough for our reduction.
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P1{Σ} = p|Σ|(1− p)n−|Σ| =
(
pαn(1− p)(1−αn)
)n
=: q(αn)
n,
P0{Σ} = p|Σ|(1− p)n−|Σ| =
(
pαn(1− p)(1−αn)
)n
=: q(αn)
n,
where q(α) = pα(1− p)(1−α) and q(α) = pα(1− p)(1−α).
We are now ready to consider the Bayesian posterior belief of the decision maker at time two:
µi,2 = P{θ = 1|aε,1 = 1 for all ε ∈ Eˆ and aκ,0 = 0}
= P{θ = 1|Σ is a set cover and κ announces 0}
=
∑
Σ∈Ξˆ
P1{sτ = 1 for all τ ∈ Σ}Pκ,1{sκ = 0}ν(1)∑
θ∈{0,1}
∑
Σ∈Ξˆ
Pθ{sτ = 1 for all τ ∈ Σ}Pκ,θ{sκ = 0}ν(θ)
=
∑
Σ∈Ξˆ
P1{sτ = 1 for all τ ∈ Σ}Pκ,1{sκ = 0}ν(1)∑
θ∈{0,1}
∑
Σ∈Ξˆ
Pθ{sτ = 1 for all τ ∈ Σ}Pκ,θ{sκ = 0}ν(θ)
=
∑
Σ∈Ξˆ
P1{Σ}Pκ,1{sκ = 0}ν(1)∑
θ∈{0,1}
∑
Σ∈Ξˆ
Pθ{Σ}Pκ,θ{sκ = 0}ν(θ)
=
∑
Σ∈Ξˆ
p|Σ|(1− p)n−|Σ|Pκ,1{sκ = 0}∑
θ∈{0,1}
∑
Σ∈Ξˆ
Pθ{Σ}Pκ,θ{sκ = 0}
,
where in the last equality we invoke the common uniform prior ν(1) = ν(0) = 0.5. It is advantageous to
consider the log posterior ratio given by:
φi,2 = log
(∑
Σ∈Ξˆ p
|Σ|(1− p)n−|Σ|Pκ,1{sκ = 0}∑
Σ∈Ξˆ p
|Σ|(1− p)n−|Σ|Pκ,0{sκ = 0}
)
= log
(∑
Σ∈Ξˆ p
|Σ|(1− p)n−|Σ|∑
Σ∈Ξˆ p
|Σ|(1− p)n−|Σ|
)
+ λκ = log
(∑
Σ∈Ξˆ,|Σ|=αnn p
|Σ|(1− p)n−|Σ|∑
Σ∈Ξˆ,|Σ|=αnn p
|Σ|(1− p)n−|Σ|
)
+ λκ
= log
(∑
Σ∈Ξˆ,|Σ|=αnn q(αn)
n∑
Σ∈Ξˆ,|Σ|=αnn q(αn)
n
)
+ λκ(A.1)
We now investigate this Bayesian posterior in the YES and NO cases of VERTEX-COVER (Problem 3).
A.1. Bayesian Posterior in the NO Case:
If we are in the NO case, then all vertex covers are of a large size: |Σ| ≥ 0.999n for all Σ ∈ Ξˆ. In the
NO case, (A.1) becomes:
φi,2 = log
(∑
Σ∈Ξˆ q(αn)
n∑
Σ∈Ξˆ q(αn)
n
)
+ λκ = log
(∑
Σ∈Ξˆ,|Σ|=αnn,αn>0.999 q(αn)
n∑
Σ∈Ξˆ,|Σ|=αnn,αn>0.999 q(αn)
n
)
+ λκ
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Let q(α) := log
(
q¯(α)/q(α)
)
= α log(14/9)− log(7/6), in particular it is a strictly increasing function of
α. Subsequently, we can bound the log-posterior ratio of agent i at time 2 as follows:
In the NO case, where each vertex cover Σ has size |Σ| ≥ 0.999n, we have:
nq(0.999) + λκ < φi,2. (I)
A.2. Bayesian Posterior in the YES Case:
If we are in the YES case, then there exists a small vertex cover Σ? with |Σ?| = α?nn ≤ 0.85n. We will
show that the total contribution from all large vertex covers |Σ| ≥ 0.998n is dominated by the likelihood
of smaller vertex cover(s). We use the Chernoff bound with Kullback-Leibler divergence to control the
contribution of large vertex covers. Accordingly, the probability that the private signals give a set Σ with
Σ ≥ 0.998n is at most (0.41)n:
P1
{
|Σ| =
n∑
k=1
sk > (0.998)n
}
≤ exp(−nDKL(0.998||0.4)) = (0.4061...)n ≤ 0.41n
On the other hand, since |Σ?| = α?nn ≤ 0.85n, we have: Pi,1{Σ?} =
(
pα
?
n(1− p)1−α?n)n ≥ (p0.85(1− p)0.15)n =
(0.425 . . .)n ≥ 0.42n. Therefore, in the YES case, conditioned on θ = 1 and Σ being a vertex cover, we
must have that |Σ| ≤ 0.998n except with exponentially small probability (the latter probability is dom-
inated by the probability of the small vertex cover Σ?). We can repeat the same argument for θ = 0 to
get:
P0
{
|Σ| =
n∑
k=1
sk > (0.998)n
}
≤ exp(−nDKL(0.998||0.3)) = (0.3048...)n ≤ 0.31n,
while for the small vertex cover Σ?, we have:
P0{Σ?} =
(
pα
?
n(1− p
)1−α?n
)n ≥ (p0.85(1− p)0.15)n = (0.34065 . . .)n ≥ 0.34n.
Here again, the total contribution from all large vertex covers is exponentially dominated by the
contribution from the small vertex cover Σ?.
We are now ready to bound the log-posterior ratio in the YES case. Starting again from (A.1), we get:
φi,2 = log
(∑
Σ∈Ξˆ,|Σ|=αnn q(αn)
n∑
Σ∈Ξˆ,|Σ|=αnn q(αn)
n
)
+ λκ
= log
(
q(α?n)
n +
∑
Σ∈Ξˆ\{Σ?},|Σ|=αnn,αn≤0.998 q(αn)
n +
∑
Σ∈Ξˆ,|Σ|=αnn,αn>0.998 q(αn)
n
q(α?n)
n +
∑
Σ∈Ξˆ\{Σ?},|Σ|=αnn,αn≤0.998 q(αn)
n +
∑
Σ∈Ξˆ,|Σ|=αnn,αn>0.998 q(αn)
n
)
+ λκ
= log
(
q(α?n)
n +
∑
Σ∈Ξˆ\{Σ?},|Σ|=αnn,αn≤0.998 q(αn)
n +
∑
Σ∈Ξˆ,|Σ|=αnn,αn>0.998 q(αn)
n
q(α?n)
n +
∑
Σ∈Ξˆ\{Σ?},|Σ|=αnn,αn≤0.998 q(αn)
n +
∑
Σ∈Ξˆ,|Σ|=αnn,αn>0.998 q(αn)
n
)
+ λκ
= log
(
q(α?n)
n(1 + o(1)) +
∑
Σ∈Ξˆ\{Σ?},|Σ|=αnn,αn≤0.998 q(αn)
n
q(α?n)
n(1 + o(1)) +
∑
Σ∈Ξˆ\{Σ?},|Σ|=αnn,αn≤0.998 q(αn)
n
)
+ λκ
≤ nq(0.998) + o(1) + λκ,
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We can summarize our conclusions about the Bayesian posterior in the YES case as follows:
In the YES case, where there exists a vertex cover Σ? with size |Σ?| ≤ 0.85n, we have:
φi,2 ≤ nq(0.998) + o(1) + λκ. (II)
A.3. The Discrepancy between the Bayesian Posteriors in the YES and NO cases:
The lower-bound in (I) and the upper-bound in (II) on the log-posterior ratios for the YES and NO
cases are Ω(n) apart, and this already implies that there is an exp(Ω(n)) multiplicative discrepancy
between the Bayesian posterior in the two cases given by:
µi,2 =
exp(φi,2)
1 + exp(φi,2)
.(A.2)
Hence, distinguishing the posteriors to within closer than exp(n(q(0.999) − q(0.998))) multiplicative
factor requires agent i to distinguish between the YES and NO cases of the VERTEX-COVER problem
which would be NP−hard.
We can design the signal structure of agent κ in such a way that agent i’s Bayesian posterior belief
about state 1 converges to zero in the YES case and to one in the NO case. In particular, let
λκ = log
(
Pκ,1(sκ = 0)
Pκ,0(sκ = 0)
)
= −n
2
(q(0.998) + q(0.999))
Then (I) and (II) yield:
In the NO case: nq(0.999) + λκ =
n
2
(q(0.999)− q(0.998)) < φi,2 → +∞. (I′)
In the YES case: φi,2 ≤ n
2
(q(0.998)− q(0.999)) + o(1)→ −∞. (II′)
Subsequently,
In the NO case: µi,2 → 1 and ai,2 = 1 (I′′)
In the YES case: µi,2 → 0 and ai,2 = 0. (II′′)
This implies that agent i cannot determine her binary action at time 2 unless she solves the NP-hard
VERTEX-COVER problem 3, completing the proof.
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THEOREM 2: EXACT-COVER REDUCTION
Our reduction is from a variant of the classical EXACT-COVER problem. An instance of EXACT-
COVER consists of a set of n elements and a collection of sets of those elements. The computational
problem is to decide if there exists a subcollection that exactly covers the elements, i.e., each element
belongs to exactly one set in the subcollection. We use a restricted version of EXACT-COVER known
as “Restricted Exact Cover by Three Sets” (RXC3).
Problem 4 (RXC3) Consider a set of n elements Eˆn. Consider also a set Tˆn of n subsets of Eˆn, each of
them containing exactly three elements. Furthermore, assume that each element of Eˆn belongs to exactly
three sets in Eˆn.
The problem is to decide if there exists a subset Tˆ ⊆ Tˆn of size |Tˆ | = n/3 such that it covers Eˆn, i.e.,⋃
τ∈Tˆ τ = Eˆn.
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Note that we make an implicit assumption that n is divisible by three. It is known that RXC3 is
NP-complete.
Lemma 1 (Section 3 and Appendix A in Gonzalez (1985)) RXC3 is NP-complete.
Let Gˆn := (Eˆn, Tˆn) be an instance of RXC3. We encode the structure of Gˆn by a two layer network,
where the first layer are the n subset agents τ1, . . . , τn and they are connected to the n element agents
ε1, . . . , εn in the second layer, based on the inclusion relations in between the elements and subsets in Gˆn.
Subsequently, each element agent εj observes the beliefs of three subset agents. We denote these three
subsets which contain εj by ε
(1)
j , ε
(2)
j , ε
(3)
j ,∈ Tˆm. Each subset agent τ ∈ Tˆm receives a private binary
signal sτ such that:
Pτ,1{sτ = 1} = 1− Pτ,1{sτ = 0} = 1/2 =: p,
Pτ,0{sτ = 1} = 1− Pτ,0{sτ = 0} = 1/3 =: p.
It is convenient to work with the following log-likelihoods of the private signals:
`1 := log
(
Pτ,1{sτ = 1}
Pτ,0{sτ = 1}
)
= log
(
p
p
)
, `0 := log
(
Pτ,1{sτ = 0}
Pτ,0{sτ = 0}
)
= log
(
1− p
1− p
)
.
Recall our log-likelihood notation from Section 2.2. Under the above definitions, for all τ ∈ Tm we
have:
λτ = sτ (`1 − `0) + `0.
We consider also an auxiliary agent κ that is observed by all element agents, in addition to the three
subset agents that each element agent observes. Agent κ observes an independent private binary signal
sκ. The signal structure of agent κ is specified as follows:
p? := Pκ,1{sκ = 1} and p? := Pκ,0{sκ = 1}.
We choose the signal likelihoods such that λκ = sκ(`?1 − `?0) + `?0 and `?1 − `?0 = 2(`1 − `0), where:
`?1 := log
(
p?/p?
)
, `?0 := log
(
(1− p?)/(1− p?)) .
Consider the belief of element agent ε at time one, given her observations of the subset agents
ε(1), ε(2), ε(3), and the auxiliary agent κ at time zero. The log-posterior ratio of ε at time one is given by:
φε,1 = λκ +
3∑
j=1
λε(j) = sκ(`
?
1 − `?0) + `?0 + 3`0 +
3∑
j=1
sε(j)(`1 − `0)
= (`1 − `0)(2sκ +
3∑
j=1
sε(j)) + `
?
0 + 3`0.
We are interested in the decision problem for agent i at time 2, given that she does not receive a
private signal and observes that all element agents report the same following log-posterior ratio at time
one:
φε,1 = 3`1 + `
?
0, for all ε ∈ Eˆn.
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From her observations at time two, agent i learns that the private signals of the subset agents and
agent κ should satisfy the following:
2sκ +
3∑
j=1
sε(j) = 3, for all ε ∈ Eˆn.(B.1)
We denote the set of all signal profiles that satisfy (B.1) by:
Σ =
(sκ, sτ1 , . . . , sτn) ∈ {0, 1}n+1 : 2sκ +
3∑
j=1
sε(j) = 3, for all ε ∈ Eˆn
 .(B.2)
Given Σ, the Bayesian posterior of agent i at time 2 is given by:
µi,2 = P{θ = 1|φε,1 = 3`1 + `?0 for all ε ∈ Eˆ}
=
∑
(sκ,sτ1 ,...,sτn )∈Σ
P1{(sκ, sτ1 , . . . , sτn)}ν(1)∑
θ∈{0,1}
∑
(sκ,sτ1 ,...,sτn )∈Σ
Pθ{(sκ, sτ1 , . . . , sτn)}ν(θ)
=
∑
(sκ,sτ1 ,...,sτn )∈Σ
(p?)sκ(1− p?)1−sκ(p)
∑n
j=1 sτj (1− p)n−
∑n
j=1 sτj
∑
θ∈{0,1}
∑
(sκ,sτ1 ,...,sτn )∈Σ
Pθ{(sκ, sτ1 , . . . , sτn)}
where in the last equality we also invoke the common uniform prior ν(1) = ν(0) = 0.5. It is more
convenient to work with the log-posterior ratio instead:
φi,2 = log

∑
(sκ,sτ1 ,...,sτn )∈Σ
(p?)sκ(1− p?)1−sκ(p)
∑n
j=1 sτj (1− p)n−
∑n
j=1 sτj
∑
(sκ,sτ1 ,...,sτn )∈Σ
(p?)sκ(1− p?)1−sκ(p)
∑n
j=1 sτj (1− p)n−
∑n
j=1 sτj
(B.3)
If sκ = 0, then (B.1) implies that sε(j) = 1 for all ε ∈ Eˆn and j = 1, 2, 3. Therefore, (0, 1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ Σ.
This is equivalent to having sτ = 1 for all τ ∈ Tn. However, if sκ = 1, then (B.1) implies that
3∑
j=1
sε(j) = 1, for all ε ∈ Eˆn.(B.4)
In this case, any signal profile of the subset agents (sτ1 , sτ2 , . . . , sτn) that satisfies (B.4) specifies an exact
set-cover, which consists of all subsets τ ∈ Tn with sτ = 1. Therefore, there cannot be any solutions of
(B.1) with sκ = 1, unless there exists an exact cover. We now investigate the Bayesian posterior of agent
i in the YES and NO cases of RXC3 (Problem 4).
B.1. Bayesian Posterior in the NO Case:
If we are in the NO case of the RXC3 problem, then the instance Gˆn = (Eˆn, Tˆn) does not have an exact
set cover. Therefore, there are no solutions with with sκ = 1. The solution set Σ in (B.2) contains only a
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singleton where sκ = 0 and sτ = 1 for all τ ∈ Tn. Hence, in the NO case the log-posterior ratio in (B.3)
becomes:
φi,2 = log
(
(1− p?)(p)n
(1− p?)(p)n
)
= `?0 + n`1
Note that since p = 1/3 < p = 1/2, `1 = log(3/2) > 0 and φi,2 → +∞ as n → ∞. Using (A.2) we can
further conclude that µi,2 → 1 as n → ∞. The convergence is asymptotically exponentially fast with
rate n`1. We can summarize our findings for the NO case as follows:
In the NO case, where there is no exact cover of Eˆn, we have that φi,2 = `?0 + n`1.
Subsequently, the Bayesian posterior of agent i concentrates on state 1 as n→∞,
and the convergence is exponentially fast. (III)
B.2. Bayesian Posterior in the YES Case:
If we are in the YES case of the RXC3 problem, then there exists at least one exact cover of Eˆn. Recall
that such cover must contain n/3 sets from Tˆn. Let s′ = (s′κ, s′τ1 , . . . , s′τn) ∈ Σ be one such solution
corresponding to an exact cover, so that s′κ = 1 and
∑n
j=1 s
′
τj = n/3. The contributions of any such
solution s′ ∈ Σ to the Bayesian posterior can be calculated as follows:
P1{s′} = (p?)s
′
κ(1− p?)1−s′κ(p)
∑n
j=1 s
′
τj (1− p)n−
∑n
j=1 s
′
τj = (p?)(p)n/3(1− p)2n/3 =: (p?)qn,
P0{s′} = (p?)s
′
κ(1− p?)1−s′κ(p)
∑n
j=1 s
′
τj (1− p)n−
∑n
j=1 s
′
τj = (p?)(p)n/3(1− p)2n/3 =: (p?)qn,
where
q := (p)1/3(1− p)2/3 = 1/2, and q := (p)1/3(1− p)2/3 ≈ 0.529134.
Let Nˆ ≥ 1 be the number of exact cover solution in the YES case. Then the log posterior ratio of agent
i at time two is given by:
φi,2 = log
(
Nˆ · p? · qn + (1− p?) · pn
Nˆ · p? · qn + (1− p?) · pn
)
Next note that since
1/3 = p < 1/2 = p = q < 0.529134 = q,
the contribution form the exact-cover solutions in the YES case will not be dominated by the contribution
that is due to the singleton solution with sκ = 0 and sτ1 = . . . = sτn = 1. In particular, the log posterior
ratio of agent i in the limit as n→∞ is given by:
φi,2 = log
(
Nˆ · p? · qn + (1− p?) · pn
Nˆ · p? · qn + (1− p?) · pn
)
= nˆ`+O(1),
where ˆ` := log(q/q). Note that since q = 0.529134 > q = 0.5, ˆ`< 0 and φi,2 → −∞ as n → ∞. Using
(A.2) we can further conclude that µi,2 → 0 as n → ∞ with the asymptotically exponentially fast rate
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of nˆ`. We can summarize our findings for the YES case as follows:
In the YES case, where there exists an exact cover of Eˆn, we have that
φi,2 = nˆ`+O(1) as n→∞. Subsequently, the Bayesian posterior of
agent i concentrates on state 0 and the convergence is exponentially fast. (IV)
Comparing the limiting Bayesian posteriors in the YES and NO cases according to (III) and (IV)
yields that agent i cannot determine whether her Bayesian posterior concentrates on state 0 or state 1
unless she can solve NP-hard RXC3 EXACT-COVER variant.
APPENDIX C: COMPLEXITY OF BAYESIAN DECISIONS USING (A1: BAYES-GROUP)
Suppose that agent i has reached her t-th decision epoch in a general network structure. Given her
information (I1) at time t, for all s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S1 × . . . × Sn and any j ∈ N¯ t+1i she has to
update I(i)j,t−δ(j,i)(s) into I
(i)
j,t+1−δ(j,i)(s) ⊂ I
(i)
j,t−δ(j,i)(s). If δ(j, i) = t+ 1 then agent j is being considered
for the first time at the t-th decision epoch and I(i)j,0(s) = {sj} ×
∏
k 6=j Sk is initialized without any
calculations. However if δ(j, i) ≤ t, then I(i)j,t−δ(j,i)(s) can be updated into I
(i)
j,t+1−δ(j,i)(s) ⊂ Ij,t−δ(j,i)(s)
only by verifying the condition a(i)k,t−δ(j,i)(s
′) = a(i)k,t−δ(j,i)(s) for every s
′ ∈ I(i)j,t−δ(j,i)(s) and k ∈ Nj : any
s′ ∈ I(i)j,t−δ(j,i)(s) that violates this condition for some k ∈ Nj is eliminated and I
(i)
j,t+1−δ(j,i)(s) is thus
obtained by pruning I(i)j,t−δ(j,i)(s).
Verification of a(i)k,t−δ(j,i)(s
′) = a(i)k,t−δ(j,i)(s) involves calculations of a
(i)
k,t−δ(j,i)(s
′) and a(i)k,t−δ(j,i)(s) ac-
cording to (4.3). The latter requires the addition of card(I(i)k,t−δ(j,i)(s)) product terms uk(ak, θ′) Pθ′(s′)
ν(θ′) = uk(ak, θ′) P1,θ′(s′1) . . . Pn,θ′(s′n) ν(θ′) for each s′ ∈ I(i)k,t−δ(j,i)(s), θ′ ∈ Θ, and ak ∈ Ak to evaluate
the left hand-side of (4.3). Hence, we can estimate the total number of additions and multiplications re-
quired for calculation of each (conditionally) feasible action a(i)k,t−δ(j,i)(s) asA . (n+2) .m . card(I
(i)
k,t−δ(j,i)(s)),
wherem := card(Θ) and A = maxk∈[n] card(Ak). Hence the total number of additions and multiplications
undertaken by agent i at time t for determining actions a(i)k,t−δ(j,i)(s) can be estimated as follows:
A . (n+ 2) . card(Θ) .
∑
j:δ(j,i)≤t,
∑
k∈Nj
card(Ik,t−δ(j,i)(s)) ≤ A . (n+ 2) . n .Mn−1 .m,(C.1)
where we upper-bound the cardinality of the union of the higher-order neighborhoods of agent i by the
total number of agents: card(N¯ t+1i ) ≤ n and use the inclusion relationship I(i)k,t−δ(j,i)(s) ⊂ I
(i)
k,0(s) =
{sk} ×
∏
j 6=k Sj to upper-bound card(I(i)k,t−δ(j,i)(s)) by Mn−1 where M is the largest cardinality of finite
signal spaces, Sj , j ∈ [n] . As the above calculations are performed at every signal profile s ∈ S1× . . .Sn
the total number of calculations (additions and multiplications) required for the Bayesian decision at
time t can be bounded as follows:
A .Mn ≤ A .C1 ≤ (n+ 2) . n .M2n−1 .m,(C.2)
where we apply (C.1) for the right-hand side. In particular, the calculations grow exponential in the
number of agents n. Once agent i calculates the action sets a(i)k,t−δ(j,i)(s) for all k ∈ Nj with δ(j, i) ≤ t she
can then update the feasible signal profiles I(i)j,t−δ(j,i)(s), following step 1 of (A1), to obtain I
(i)
j,t+1−δ(j,i)(s)
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for all j : δ(j, i) ≤ t+ 1 and any s ∈ S1 × . . .× Sn. This in turn enables her to calculate the conditional
actions of her neighbors a(i)j,t(s) at every signal profile and to eliminate any s for which the conditionally
feasible action set a(i)j,t(s) does not agree with the observed action aj,t for some j ∈ Ni. She can thus update
her list of feasible signal profiles from I i,t to I i,t+1 and adopt the corresponding Bayesian belief µi,t+1
and action ai,t+1. The latter involves an additional (n+ 2)mAcard(I i,t+1) additions and multiplication
which are nonetheless dominated by the number calculations required in (C.2) for the simulation of other
agents’ actions at every signal profile. Q.E.D.
APPENDIX D: COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY OF (A2:BAYES-TRANSITIVE)
According to (I2), in a transitive structure at time t agent i has access to the list of feasible private
signals for each of her neighbors: Sj,t, j ∈ Ni given their observations up until that point in time. The
feasible signal set for each agent j ∈ Ni is calculated based on the actions taken by others and observed
by agent j until time t− 1 together with possible private signals that can explain her history of choices:
aj,0, aj,1, and so on up until her most recent choice which is aj,t. At time t, agent i will have access to
all the observations of every agent in her neighborhood and can vet their most recent choices aj,t against
their observations to eliminate the incompatible private signals from the feasible set Sj,t and obtain
an updated list of feasible signals Sj,t+1 for each of her neighbors j ∈ Ni. This pruning is achieved by
calculating aj,t(sj) given Ij,t(sj) = {sj}×
∏
k∈Nj Sj,t for each sj ∈ Sj,t and removing any incompatible
sj that violates the condition aj,t = aj,t(sj); thus obtaining the pruned set Sj,t+1. The calculation of
aj,t(sj) given Ij,t(sj) = {sj} ×
∏
k∈Nj Sj,t is performed according to (4.3) but the decomposition of the
feasible signal profiles based on the relation Ij,t(sj) = {sj}×
∏
k∈Nj Sj,t together with the independence
of private signals across different agents help reduce the number of additions and multiplications involved
as follows:
aj,t(sj) = arg max
aj∈Aj
∑
θ′∈Θ
uj(aj , θ
′)
∑
s′∈Ii,t(sj) Pθ′(s
′)ν(θ′)∑
θ′′∈Θ
∑
s′∈Ii,t(sj) Pθ′′(s
′)ν(θ′′)
= arg max
aj∈Aj
∑
θ′∈Θ
uj(aj , θ
′)
Pθ′(sj)
∏
k∈Nj
∑
sk∈Sk,t Pθ′(sk)ν(θ
′)∑
θ′′∈Θ Pθ′′(sj)
∏
k∈Nj
∑
sk∈Sk,t Pθ′′(sk)ν(θ
′′)
.
Hence, the calculation of the conditionally feasible action aj,t(sj) for each sj ∈ Sj,t can be achieved
through card(Θ) A
∑
k∈Nj card(Sk,t) additions and card(Θ) (card(Nj) + 2)A multiplications; subse-
quently, the total number of additions and multiplications required for agent i to update the feasible
private signals of each of her neighbor can be estimated as follows:
A
∑
j∈Ni
card(Θ)card(Sj,t)
∑
k∈Nj
card(Sk,t) + card(Nj) + 2
 ≤ An2M2m+An2Mm+ 2nMmA,(D.1)
where M , n, m and A are as in (C.2). After updating her lists for the feasible signal profiles of
all her agents the agent can refine her list of feasible signal profiles I i,t+1 = {si} ×
∏
j∈Ni Sj,t+1
and determine her belief µi,t+1 and refined choice ai,t+1. The latter is achieved through an extra
card(Θ)A
∑
j∈Ni card(Sj,t+1) additions and card(Θ)A (card(Ni) + 2) multiplications, which are dom-
inated by the required calculations in (D.1). Most notably, the computations required of the agent for
determining her Bayesian choices in a transitive network increase polynomially in the number of agents
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n, whereas in a general network structure using (A1) these computations increase exponentially fast in
the number of agents n. Q.E.D.
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